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Private law theory plays a role (for better or worse) in the 
practice of law, whether that be in education or providing 
criticism, or contextualizing within a broader frame what private 
law does and why it does what it does. Yet some say that private 
law theory neglects history while others say that it does not fully 
capture history’s possibilities. In this paper, I explore what it 
means to use history in theorising by exploring how analytical 
philosophy has engaged with history since the 1960s, suggesting 
three possible historical avenues of private law theory. 
 
Introduction 
Some say that private law theory neglects history while others 
say that it does not fully capture history’s possibilities.1  
Additionally, it has been said that the general approach of private 
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1 S Waddams, "Classification of Private Law in Relation to Historical 
Evidence: Description, Prescription, and Conceptual Analysis" in Andrew 
Lewis and Michael Lobban (eds), Law and History, Current Legal Issues, vol 
6, (2003) 265-284 at 267; B Bix, Contract Law: Rules, Theory and Context 
(2012) 151; M Hogg, Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives 
(2011) 173; S Hedley, “Corrective Justice – An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?” 
in M Del Mar & M Lobban (eds), Law in Theory and History: New Essays 
on a Neglected Dialogue (2016) 305-325 at 308-309; W Lucy, The 
Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 425; H Dagan, Reconstructing American 
Legal Realism & Rethinking Private Law Theory (2003) 23. 
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law theory is too abstract without history. Specifically, these 
comments are directed towards contemporary Anglo-American 
literature of the last few decades.2 In this paper, I want to explore 
what it means to use history in theorising.3 What can history 
offer to theories about private law? How should history be 
approached? How can history and theory be done together? I will 
argue that history offers a legitimate and profitable path for 
theory. I do not contend that is it necessary but I do argue that it 
is potentially generative and instructive. I will try to show how 
history can be generative for theory by considering in very 
general terms how moral and political philosophy has engaged 
with history since the 1960s. Based on my brief survey of 
political and philosophical literature, I will suggest three types 
of historical approach which may offer new directions or genres 
for private law theory if (or when) it does engage with history. I 
also write this paper with a sense that there is a growing 
discussion across different forms or subsets of legal theory about 
the relationship between theory and history. There is a 
reassessment, in some fields of legal theory’s relationship to and 
use of history or the past. Particularly in subjects like 
international law or criminal law there is an emerging historical 
consciousness,4 indeed it can also be seen in general legal 
theory.5 It is not so much that history has been forgotten and that 
 
2 In this paper, I’ll confine my comments to Anglo-American literature. By 
this I mean work published in Anglo-American journals or printed by Anglo-
American publishers. I’d add that it is literature which is generally about case 
law rather than legislation or Codes; it is often focused on modes of legal 
reasoning and judicial adjudication and with an implicit common law focus. 
However, in European literature there are those who write and engage with 
Anglo-American private law theory thus the geographical nature of the 
distinction may be unsatisfactory. For example, Jans Smits, Ralf Michaels 
and Martijn Hesselink write in English, reference Anglo-American literature 
and appear to address similar questions. However, it is my impression that 
Smits, Michaels and Hesselink do not neglect of history in the same way as 
Anglo-American literature but that is for another day. See Franz Wieacker, A 
History of Private Law in Europe: With Particular Reference to Germany 
trans. by T Weir (1997); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, “Private Law and the 
State: Comparative Perceptions and Historic Observations” 71 Rabels 
Zeitschrift fuer auslaendisches und internationales Privatrecht (2006) 345-
397. 
3 I will use a basic distinction in this paper between the past, as in what has 
happened before now and histories, as in how we construct, order, understand 
and engage with the past. 
4 For international law, see M Craven, “Theorizing the Turn to History in 
International Law” in A Orford & F Hoffman (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Theory of International Law (2016) 22-38 and for criminal law see, N 
Lacy, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions 
(2016), Ch 6; L Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization 
and Civil Order (2016) Ch 10; and C Kennedy, “In Search of Criminal 
Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions” EdinLR 21 (1) (2007) 133-
134. 
5 See D Priel & C L Barzun, “Jurisprudence and (Its) History” Osgoode Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series 11 (5) (2015); Special Issue, Opportunities for 
Law’s Intellectual History, Buffalo Law Review 64 (1) (2016); M Del Mar & 
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the literature is rediscovering history but rather the role of history 
or the past is being reappraised. Therefore, if private law theory 
follows these developments what shape would it take? 
 
Preface on why this matters 
At the outset, it is worth expressing that our approach or 
understanding of private law matters, including how history is 
used by private law theory. Private law theory plays a role (for 
better or worse) in the practice of law, whether that be in 
education or providing criticism or contextualising within a 
broader frame what private law does and why it does what it 
does. Therefore, before suggesting the merits of a historical 
angle on such questions, which is essentially a theoretical or 
methodological exercise, it may be necessary to iterate why we 
should bother with private law theory in the first place.  
First, we could be wasting our time in private law theory. 
Or possibly propping up an ailing unjust institution or idea.6 It 
might be that contract or property is something created by 
academics, which doesn’t map upon either the practice of courts 
or commercial reality.  
Second, organisation and definition matters in private 
law theory and this has consequences for individuals.7 Denying 
something is a contract with associated rights, may deny a 
remedy. Or saying something is a contract incorporating rights, 
may give a remedy.8  
Third, private law enables as well as disables types of 
action. It creates and denies a space for action. Contracts transfer 
wealth and assets - they take from one person, and give to 
another. Tort provides remedies for wrongs, and if you are 
unsuccessful you may receive no compensation and no sense of 
justice. Property law protects your possessions, it excludes 
others from using, enjoying or benefiting from your material 
objects or creations. But if we decide that a creation such as song, 
invention or idea should not be defined as property it may mean 
that others can use or exploit what would otherwise be 
considered yours. Private law permits as much as it prohibits.9  
 
M Lobban (eds), Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected 
Dialogue (2016); M Del Mar, ‘Philosophical Analysis and Historical Inquiry: 
Theorising Normativity, Law and Legal Thought’, in Markus Dubber and 
Christopher Tomlins (eds), Oxford Handbook of Legal Historical Research 
(forthcoming); and Markus D. Dubber has posted Legal History As Legal 
Scholarship: Doctrinalism, Interdisciplinarity, and Critical Analysis of Law 
in Dubber & Tomlins (eds) Oxford Handbook of Historical Legal Research 
(forthcoming). 
6 N MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality (2008), Ch 8. 
7 H Dagan, Reconstructing American Legal Realism & Rethinking Private 
Law Theory (2013), Ch 5. 
8 W Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning” (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710-770. 
9 A Kronman, “Contract Law and Distributive Justice” (1979-1990) 89 Yale 
Law Journal 472; D Kennedy, “The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!” 
(1991) 15 Legal Studies Forum 328-361; and J Kraus, “Philosophy of 
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Fourthly, there is the question of justification or political 
desirability. Some might say, if we cannot find suitable or 
satisfactory answer to these questions of both organisation and 
justification, we might then question whether modern private 
law is worth keeping or is in need to fundamental change. Even 
if we decide to keep such ideas, questions of welfare and 
efficiency may be asked. Is private law, as presently practiced, 
the best way to meet the goals or values it captures?  
Fifthly, modern problems of global inequality or national 
inequality are indirectly linked to the private law structures that 
underpin and conceptualise our wealth, assets and rights as 
encapsulated within the domain of modern sovereign states.10  
Sixthly, politicians, policy-makers and society at large 
may ask why we should retain the concepts of private law and 
not transition to less legalistic, esoteric and complex methods of 
managing property, contracts and wrongs. Private law theory 
addresses, albeit indirectly these larger questions but also these 
individual questions of remedy. If it isn’t getting it right, then 
answering these questions become harder. Private law theory is 
about such things.  
But what do I mean by private law theory? 
 
Private law theory 
Private law theory is a relatively new label, which could be more 
of a nuisance than assistance. Potentially, it is too early to say 
that there is something “new” here which requires a name. 
However, Peter Cane says “plausibly, the genesis of private law 
theory as a discrete area of academic study might be traced to the 
publication of Ronald Coase’s famous article, “The Problem of 
Social Cost” in 1960”.”11 In response, Cane says a rival school 
of analysis emerged in the early 1980s “loosely referred to ever 
since as ‘corrective justice theory.’”12 Another strand of thought, 
which could roughly be associated with private law theory is 
what Cane calls, “a critique of the ways in which (private) law 
affects the distribution of risk, wealth and power within 
society.”13 To a large extent, these remain the three schools of 
thought which dominate private law theorising. As John 
Goldberg has said existing “academic debates in private law 
theory over the last forty years have tended overwhelmingly to 
focus on, or presume the existence of, a fundamental divide 
between welfarist or efficiency theories, on the one hand, and 
 
Contract Law” in J L Coleman, K Himma & S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law” (2004; 2012 online). 
10 M Blake, “Distributive Justice, State, Coercion, and Autonomy” (2002) 30 
(3) 30 Philosophy & Public Affairs 257-296; T Nagel, “The Problem of 
Global Justice” (2005) 33 (2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 113-147; and A J 
Juilis, “Nagel’s Atlas” (2006) 34 (2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 176-192. 
11 P Cane, “The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay” 
OJLS 25 (2) (2005) 203-217, 203. 
12 Ibid, 204. 
13 Ibid, 205. 
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deontological or rights-based theories, on the other. Indeed, 
anyone who writes in the private law fields is sooner or later 
asked to declare loyalty to one or another of these camps.”14  
Not necessarily in contradiction with Cane’s analysis, 
Steve Hedley has spoken about “Big Private Law Theory” as 
consisting of generally three approaches, the legal economists 
who see private law capturing “peoples’ rights and entitlements 
in the market place, it defines what they can buy and sell, sets 
out the implications of each, and protects their choices to trade 
or not to trade”; the legal moralist who think private law makes 
“as a statement of personal responsibilities, and is in that sense 
rather more than a mass of technical rules”; and lastly, the 
doctrinalist, who “gives a clear exposition of what private law is 
– sums it up in a few key propositions or taxonomic structures – 
and tries to leave it at that.”15 In a similar manner to Hedley, 
Nicholas McBride has written about three explanations of 
private law, i.e. the law and economics approach, the Kantian 
approach and legal moralism which could be taken to constitute 
“currently popular” ways to theorise about private law 
(particularly Anglo-American private law).16 When McBride 
speaks of “legal moralism” as a theory which takes tort law and 
private law more generally as “a form of applied morality…”17  
The literature above suggests five different approaches 
within private law theory: law and economics, corrective justice, 
legal moralism, doctrinalist and critical legal studies. However, 
Cane captures a more streamlined presentation of private law 
theory, and if we follow his gloss that “justice theorists seem 
united in the idea that private law is best understood ‘non-
instrumentally’, as a relatively autonomous universe of 
normative discourse…”18 then I think we could accommodate 
legal moralism and doctrinalists into a general category of 
theorist who see private law as, in Hedley’s words, “more than 
mass of technical rules” but concerned with individual rights or 
obligations or duties which have an individual moral 
significance. Hence, I will use the term non-instrumental to 
describe the legal moralist, the corrective justice theorist and the 
doctrinalist. It could be challenged that the doctrinalist does not 
take a standpoint, at least if we follow Hedley’s general 
description. I would argue the decision to take a neutral 
standpoint on the bigger questions of private law or to take an 
agnostic position nevertheless carries with it at the very least a 
latent positivism or potentially an implicit rejection of a law and 
 
14 J C P Goldberg, “Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law” (2012) 125 
(18) HarvLRev 1640-1663, 1662. 
15 S Hedley, “Is Private Law Meaningless” (2011) 64 (1) Current Legal 
Problems 89–116 at 90 
16 N McBride, “The Humanity of Private Law – An Introduction” University 
of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No 63 (2015) 1-49. 
17 Ibid, 30. 
18 Cane, 205. 
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economics analysis and the critical studies position. That is, a 
doctrinalist rejects the notions that private law is accessory or 
ancillary to something else. In doing that, at the very least there 
is sense that one is committed to a non-instrumentalist 
perspective - they assuming there is such a thing as private law, 
that it can be ordered and organised without recourse to 
something other than the legal matter of courts, legislation and 
other legal material. Therefore, if this division is workable, we 
are left with the instrumentalists, the non-instrumentalists and 
the critical studies approach to private law.  
 
Private law theory and history 
It might first be useful to examine in more detail what private 
law theory is said to neglect. Some argue that private law theory 
is imprecise. Others say it ignores the complexity of law and its 
historical development whereas some are concerned with 
whether the history of law offers anything generative for theory. 
In terms of instrumentalist and non-instrumentalists, complaints 
are often concerned with the lack of either geographical or 
temporal precision. For example, Stephen Waddams has said 
that in “assessing the many and various accounts that have been 
offered of Anglo-American private law, it is often difficult to tell 
to what extent the statements about law includes or implies 
actual assertions about the past.”19 More directly, Brian Bix has 
said that “contract theory should focus on a single legal system 
at a particular time; thus, there should usually be different 
theories of different countries (although each different country’s 
theory would be dependent on how divergent the rules and 
practices are).”20 In a similar vein, Martin Hogg has argued that 
theories of contract law should be explained according to time, 
place and circumstance rather than holding to the vague notion 
of discovering the Platonic truth or pure essence of “contract 
law”. To Hogg, “Searching…for a single and universally correct 
theory of contract, one that will hold good at all times and in all 
places, seems flawed.”21 Speaking specifically about corrective 
justice scholars, Steve Hedley has criticised the “reluctance [of 
corrective justice theorists] to commit themselves to a particular 
place and time (and so assuming that ‘private law’ has an essence 
which transcends particular legal jurisdictions).”22  
Others are more concerned with the complexity of law 
and how the past relates to contemporary theories. For example, 
 
19 S Waddams, "Classification of Private Law in Relation to Historical 
Evidence: Description, Prescription, and Conceptual Analysis" in Andrew 
Lewis and Michael Lobban (eds), Law and History, Current Legal Issues, vol 
6, (2003) 265-284 at 267. 
20 B Bix, Contract Law: Rules, Theory and Context (2012) 151 
21 M Hogg, Promises and Contract Law: Comparative Perspectives (2011) 
173. 
22 S Hedley, “Corrective Justice – An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?” in M Del 
Mar & M Lobban (eds), Law in Theory and History: New Essays on a 
Neglected Dialogue (2016) 305-325 at 308-309. 
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William Lucy has challenged the assumption found in private 
law theory “that some or all of the principal and structural 
features of private law will prove to be both intelligible and 
normatively respectable.”23 For Lucy, “the assumption seems 
particularly dubious when private law’s history and complexity 
in the common law is borne in mind: it is the work of many many 
minds over a long period of time and has developed without the 
guidance that might be provided by a pre-existing blueprint.”24 
Or as Hanoch Dagan has said, “the heterogeneity of 
contemporary understandings of any given legal concept (such 
as property or contract) within and outside any given 
jurisdiction, as well as the wealth of additional alternatives that 
legal history offers, defies the formalist quest for conceptual 
essentialism.”25 Sheehan and Arvind have said that private law 
theory is dominated by conceptual debates but that 
“taxonomy…cannot be done through definition or deterministic 
logical reasoning, but turns equally on questions of 
purpose…context…and history...”26 Moreover, Anat Rosenburg 
has argued that the field of contract theory as well as legal history 
has settled on a simplistic understanding of contract’s history. 
She notes a strange contradiction in that “no historian would 
resist the suggestion of cultural complexity, of contradictory or 
alternative interpretations of contract and of individualism in 
contract, certainly not after the cultural turn of the last few 
decades. Contract histories, however, have not only left this issue 
little explored and little conceptualized; they have somewhat 
inadvertently secured the opposite notion of cultural 
homogeneity.”27 By implication, Rosenburg suggests that both 
legal history and contract theory allow each to misuse, 
misinterpret or ignore each other’s conclusions in order to 
support their own narratives or explanations. 
Critical Legal Studies, by contrast, is rich with history 
but is losing its connection with theory or a sense of direction.28 
Hence, you do not find express statements in the literature 
lamenting neglect or ignorance. Indeed, one of the lasting 
impacts of the critical studies movement has been critical legal 
history, which in many instances is somewhat indistinguishable 
from general history in its method.29 History has been important 
to the approach of Critical Legal Studies; in a similar way to 
 
23 W Lucy, The Philosophy of Private Law (2007) 425. 
24 Ibid. 
25 H Dagan, Reconstructing American Legal Realism & Rethinking Private 
Law Theory (2003) 23. 
26 D Sheehan & TT Arvind, “Private law theory and taxonomy: reframing the 
debate” (2015) 35(3) Legal Studies 408-501, 501. 
27 A Rosenburg, “Contract’s Meaning and the Histories of Classical Contract 
Law” 59 McGill Law Journal 165, 1-43, 37. 
28 R W Gordon, Taming the Past: Essays on Law in History and History in 
law (2017). 
29 See Symposium on Gordon's “Critical Legal Histories” Law & Social 
Inquiry (2012) 147-215. 
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empirical studies which demonstrate contradiction or the 
dissonance between rhetoric and practice, or studies which 
outline the indeterminacy of legal reasoning, historical 
approaches often demonstrate the contingency or fluidity of law. 
Or critical studies might stress, through historical methods, that 
law is a product of social factors, interests or politics. Historical 
approaches can show how society, power and policy have 
produced or shaped or influenced and continue to form what 
private law is in both a direct and indirect manner. Therefore, it 
might appear strange to say that critical legal theory should pay 
more attention to history and what it can offer. But some have 
questioned how history is used in critical historical studies. 
Katharina Isabel Schmidt, for instance, has said that 
“what they have not always done [critical legal historians]…is 
draw on large historical time scales for the purpose of 
formulating, illustrating, and strengthening their arguments.”30 
She went on to say, theorists of private law and legal historians 
generally should not, however, “shy away from big ideas and big 
legal history…”31 Speaking specifically about the limitations of 
critical legal history and its general message, Robert Gordon has 
acknowledged that “the notion that every form of legality is a 
constructed artifact rather than a natural or determined fact is 
useful for understanding the genealogy of current conditions, but 
at the same time tends … to deprive people of any strong basis 
for confidence in transcendent standpoints for critique of the 
present order.”32 Chris Tomlins is concerned as to where this 
contingency leads. He says “ultimately, totalized contingency is 
a deeply tragic form of subversion, for it does not discriminate 
in the paralysis it metes out. In undermining the authority of all 
narratives, it spares none, not even those that may be precious to 
the powerless, those whom we once desired to liberate.”33 When 
he asks what is left of the critique once contextualisation and 
contingency are accepted, he concludes that “the final and 
unfortunately depressing answer to our question may be that 
what is left after critique is merely a blur of similitude, as the 
field of law and society joins all post-critical scholarship in the 
energetic but sadly pointless pursuit of an essentially bourgeois 
aesthetic of complexity, of endless, causeless relationality.”34 To 
 
30 K I Schmidt, “Henry Maine’s ‘Modern Law’” From Status to Contract and 
Back Again” (2017) 65 The American Journal of Comparative Law 145-186, 
185-186. 
31 K Isabel Schmidt has made this sort of argument: K I Schmidt, “Henry 
Maine’s ‘Modern Law’” From Status to Contract and Back Again” (2017) 65 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 145-186, 185-186. 
32 R W Gordon, “The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and 
Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument” in T J McDonald, In 
The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences (1996) 339–378, 365. 
33 C Tomlins, “What is left of the law and society paradigm after critique? 
Revisiting Robert Gordon’s ‘Critical Legal Histories’”37 (1) Law and Social 
Inquiry (2012), 155–166, 166. 
34 Ibid. 
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be sure, Gordon is not as concerned as Tomlins: he says “all 
history can tell us is that opportunities for remaking law always 
exist and, if seized in the sport of adventure and pragmatic 
experiment, may sometimes lead to better state of the world than 
those we have come to accept out of compliancy or despair.”35 
For as much as this has consequence for general understandings 
of law, it has relevance to how critical legal scholars theorise 
about private law. 
 
Precision, complexity and isolation 
These complaints or concerns which are found in literature 
relating to private law theory divide into three types of complaint 
concerning: precision, complexity or isolation. But each, I would 
say, equally supposes there is a role for history but does not make 
that role evident or use it in a generative or productive way.36 
First, it appears that what some scholars like Hogg or Waddams 
want is more specificity, which may not equate to a request for 
more history but would is suggestive of its ability to provide it. 
Arguably, however, what is at the heart of these types of 
complaint is that private law theory be bolder: either a theory 
state that their approach transcends, applying across the history 
of law or it does not. A theorist may just say, ‘yes, my theory 
does apply universally’ but it was either forgotten, 
misunderstood or not discovered until now. However, there is an 
underlying suspicion or strategy in these complaints: that many 
private law theorists do not want to make the universal claim but 
do wish nonetheless to benefit from the explanatory reach of a 
universal claim. However, by posing the specificity-question or 
complaint towards private law theory you are at the first step in 
an argument, which eventually works towards a relativity claim 
about private law. Second, those like Dagan and Lucy, who 
stress the complexity of law and its past, are posing a challenge, 
suggesting the burden of proof is upon the theorist.37 That is, in 
making the universal claim it could be argued that a theorist 
should be prepared to support this theory with a version of 
history which generally supports their claims.38 Often the 
concern is that private law theory has reduced and flatten the 
 
35 R Gordon, “‘Critical Legal Histories Revisited’: A Response” (2012) 37 
(1) Law & Social Inquiry 200-215, 215. 
36 Tomlins has offered an extensive theory as to what role history can play: C 
Tomlins, “The Strait Gate: The Past, History, and Legal Scholarship (2009) 4 
Law, Culture and the Humanities 11-42; “After Critical Legal History: Scope, 
Scale, Structure (2012) 8 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 31-68. I 
would link his theory to the imaginative role which rational reconstruction 
can offer, which is discussed below. 
37 For a good example of this type of challenge, see J Goupkamp & J Murphy, 
“The Failure of Universal Theories of Tort Law” (2015) 21 Legal Theory 47-
85. 
38 I’d suggest that the work of James Gordley is an important exception to 
this: J Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine 
(1991); Foundations of Private Law (2006). 
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contours and density of private law to banal statements or 
disconnected generalisations. Again, it may be that the strategy 
here is attempting to place the burden of proof upon the 
abstraction or equally a step towards adopting a more relativist 
conception of your theory of private law.39 Or it could be a 
genuine request to understand how and in what ways the general 
theory relates to law’s past and its changing nature. Third, there 
is the concern posed by Tomlins and acknowledged by Gordon. 
If you continually contextualise, stress the contingency of law, 
speak of its fluidity, then you are left, potentially, without a 
positive or most substantive message or purpose. Such an 
opinion may take you towards the type of approach advocated 
by, for example, Schmidt. Indeed, Schmidt’s confidence raises 
the question of where private law theory may go if it takes up the 
challenge of engaging with history and the past and what that 
type of scholarship would look like. Indeed more widely, if the 
problems of  imprecision, reduction and isolation are to be 
addressed by taking private law’s past seriously then it would be 
of benefit to consider how philosophy has engaged with the past. 
 
Learning from philosophical history 
It might be asked, why not learn from other disciplines such as 
economics, sociology or anthropology? Each has in its own way 
engaged with either the history of their discipline or what the 
past means in terms of method. It could be said that preferring 
philosophy needs some justification; but I hope not too much. 
First, a large branch of philosophy seeks to explain, understand 
or analyse normativity itself or structures, behaviour and 
practices which are normative. Second, conceptual analysis is a 
central task of contemporary philosophy and consideration of 
concepts use and deployment a common concern of political and 
moral philosophy. Understanding, examining and considering 
the use of concepts is a key part of private law theory there would 
appear to be a similarity in method to a great or lessor extent.40 
Third, and related to the second is that to a large extend 
contemporary private law theory is a form of philosophy 
(broadly defined). Or you could say it borrows from philosophy 
arguments, modes of analysis and theories. Therefore, I do not 
see any meaningful difference between a philosophical enquiry 
 
39 For example, see A Beever, Forgotten Justice (2013) and its withering 
critique, D Priel, “Private Law: Commutative or Distributive?” Osgoode 
CLPE Research Paper No. 56/2013, published in the (2012) 77 (2) Modern 
Law 308–331. 
40 Conceptual analysis can be understood as (i) disassembling a concept into 
its competent, and revealing the logical relationship between each of those 
parts; or (ii) breaking down a concept to constitutive parts through a process 
of rolling back until you reach a fundamental level or first principles required 
to constitute the concept; or (iii) it can also be understood as a process of 
interpretation and transformation of a concept into logic or more basic 
concepts which represent a more fundamental description of what is being 
considered.     
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into law or private law specifically and say a philosophical 
enquiry into knowledge, identity or causation or in fact 
economics, politics, morality or literature;41 adding law or legal 
merely specifics the field of study, i.e. law. The same goes for 
the term “history” or using the prefix of legal before history. 
There does not seem to be any major difference between history 
in general and legal history apart from the focus.42 But maybe it 
would be safer to bracket off definitional questions of what 
philosophy or what history is and what is the difference between 
legal philosophy and philosophy more generally. One reason to 
bracket things at this stage is because depending on your mode 
of enquiry, you may in fact be asking the very question, what 
legal philosophy is, or what legal history is, and using history or 
denying the usefulness of history in answering such questions. 
However, I would hope that we can accept that legal theory, legal 
philosophy and philosophy, as practiced today, share similarities 
and have a relationship of some sort. If there are meaningful 
differences, I would hope that they do not necessarily preclude 
my attempt to draw parallels between literatures about 
philosophical history in general and the present discussion about 
the potential for a dialogue between legal theory and legal 
history. 
 
Philosophy and history 
Richard Bernstein says in the 1960s there was “a smug 
conviction that the analytical styles of doing philosophy were the 
only legitimate ways of doing philosophy.”43 Such approaches 
to philosophy were “taken to represent standards of clarify, rigor, 
precision, and argumentative finesse” whereas there was a 
“denigration of the philosophic value of studying the history of 
philosophy and engaging with philosophic classics.”44 However 
as Richard Rorty noted the “more ‘scientific’ and ‘rigorous’ 
philosophy became, the less it had to do with the rest of culture 
and the more absurd its traditional pretensions seemed.”45 In 
turn, attempts of analytical philosophies, according to Rorty to 
“ground” this or “criticize” were and are “shrugged off by those 
whose activities were purported being grounded or criticized.”46 
Part of the problem, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, was (and 
 
41 I do not think - at least for the purposes of this paper – there is any 
significant difference between the terms legal theory and legal philosophy. I 
take both phrases to describe a form of legal scholarship which takes a 
philosophical or abstract or reflective approach to the study of law or legal 
institutions. 
42 This may put me somewhat at odds with how David Ibbeston defines legal 
history, i.e. as solely focused upon legal doctrine and rules. However, 
historians might see law differently from internal legal historians and as an 
(ever present) part history, E P Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (1978) 103. 
43 R Bernstein, Praxis and Action (1979; reprint 1999) ix 
44 Ibid, ix 
45 Ibid, 5 
46 Ibid, 5 
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still is) that “what analytical philosophy gains in clarity and 
rigor, it loses in being unable to provide decisive answer to 
substantive philosophical questions.”47 It can, according to 
MacIntyre, “rule out certain possibilities” but “for each 
alternative view that remains” it can only identify “what 
commitments one will be making by way of entailments and 
presuppositions, it is not capable in itself of producing any 
reason for asserting any one thing over any other.”48 In 2002, 
Williams said much the same; “a lot of philosophy is more 
blankly non-historical now than it has ever been. In the so-called 
analytic tradition in particular this takes the form of trying to 
make philosophy sound like an extension of science.”49 But for 
Bernard Williams what was problematic wasn’t being neglectful 
of philosophy’s own history but rather being neglectful of the 
history of its concepts.50 David Plunkett has returned to this idea 
in recent years, arguing that the facts about a concept’s history 
or genealogy can hold relevancy for normative inquiries. It can 
help us understand whether the replacement of one concept with 
another will ameliorate supposed difficulties or deficient but also 
illuminate what might be sacrificed through the replacement of 
one concept with another. Additionally, the “causal-explanatory 
reasons why agents started using a concept” may help 
understand any given concept’s content; thereby revealing 
factual rather logical constraints upon the concept’s 
development or use.51  
In 1984, Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner published an 
edited collected, Philosophy in History: Essay in the 
Historiography of Philosophy.52 It collected together a series of 
lectures given by philosophers, such as Rorty, MacIntyre and 
Taylor, philosophers sympathetic to the study of philosophy’s 
history and its possibilities. In a soft tone, the editors remarked 
that  “in Britain and America, the historiography of philosophy 
has recently been less self-conscious than it ought to have 
been.”53 They noted, “the influence of analytic philosophy has 
worked against the self-consciousness of the sort desired.”54 But 
more pointedly, they said analytical philosophers have “seen no 
need to situate themselves…because they take themselves to be 
 
47 G Borradori, The American Philosopher: Conversations With Quine, 
Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre, and Kuhn by 
Giovanna Borradori (1994) 145. 
48 Ibid, […]. 
49 R Rorty, J B Schneewind, Q Skinner (eds), Philosophy in History: Essays 
in the Historiography of Philosophy (1984). 
50 B Williams, “Why Philosophy Needs History: On Truth” LRB 17 October 
2002. 
51 D Plunkett, “Conceptual history, conceptual ethics, and the aims of inquiry: 
a framework for thinking about the relevance of the history/genealogy of 
concepts to normative inquiry” (2016) 3 (2) Ergo 27-64. 
52 R Rorty, J B Schneewind, Q Skinner (eds), Philosophy in History: Essays 
in the Historiography of Philosophy (1984), preface. 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
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the first to have understood what philosophy is, what questions 
are genuinely philosophical ones.”55 It was suggested by the 
editors that the lack of self-consciousness was less apparent 
before analytical philosophy because in days gone by philosophy 
was taught in a far more historical manner. However, this too 
had its drawbacks in that it produced “the excess of historical 
self-consciousness which Nietzsche characterised as ‘a 
disadvantage of history for life.’” But the benefits of such an 
approach, per Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner were that it 
inculcated a “sense of historical contingency, a sense that 
philosophy has meant many quite different things.”56 
Nevertheless, they were clear that they did not deny the 
analytical philosophy was of value nor did they think that 
philosophy was “best done in the form of a historical 
commentary.” But they did stress the notion that analytical 
philosophers are “missing a desirable form of self-consciousness 
as long as they ignore attempts of intellectual historians to 
inculcate a sense of historical contingency.”57 
If it be granted that there is something useful which can 
be taken from philosophy’s own discussion of its methodology 
and approach to history, and particularly these three genres, then 
I think we can take guidance and direction in scoping out what 
kind of literature would emerge from a dialogue between legal 
theory and history.58 Understanding the different ways that 
philosophy has engaged with history helps map out the paths 
which private law theory (and legal theory more generally) 
might take. The three paths are rational reconstruction, historical 
reconstruction and geistesgeschichte histories.59  
 
Rational reconstruction 
Rational reconstruction is one path. Rorty’s description suggests 
that this approach works on two levels. First, it involves 
articulating the argument, theory or idea of a historical writer. 





58 In this paper, I will not cover the anti-metaphysical turn or the pragmatic 
turn since the 1960s. Although crucially important to how one understands 
contemporary moral and political philosophy, I think a direct focus upon this 
topic would warrant a separate paper. Additionally, I think the discussion of 
rational reconstruction to some extent captures a pragmatic approach but 
certainly does not give an exhaustive account. See J Rawls, “Justice as 
fairness: political not metaphysical” (1985) 14 (3) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 223-251; R Rorty, “The priority of democracy to philosophy” in J P 
Reeder & G Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality (1992) 254-278; 
and I Hunter, “Is metaphysics a threat to liberal democracy? On Richard 
Rorty’s ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’ (2000) 95 Theoria: A 
Journal of Social and Political Theory 59-78. 
59 I have taken these three genres from Richard Rorty’s summary of 
approaches of philosophy’s history. He also includes doxology which I won’t 
consider here. 
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historical text. At this first level, you may decide to lay out the 
premises and to make explicit, in logical form, the argument used 
to support the theory. Or you might decide, at this level of 
reconstruction, to make explicit a step in the argument which is 
missing. Additionally, you may wish to underline an 
inconsistency or contradiction. You might highlight a concept or 
idea which could improve or advance the argument. 
Alternatively, you might draw attention to something, a later 
development in science for example, which undermines the 
argument, theory or idea. You do all of this with the intention of 
making clear, making explicit, and defining the theory or idea in 
consideration. In this of rational reconstruction, you make the 
theory or idea adhere to a conception of rationality which allows 
you to engage with the text. At this first level, rational 
reconstruction involves the process or re-articulation, 
reformulation and rephrasing of a historical text. You update it 
and treat the author as a contemporary. 
But why do this? What is the point? This leads to the 
second level. You might say that you read rationally 
reconstructed historical texts to inspire new ideas or to correct 
(influential) historical ideas. For example, you entertain the 
thoughts of a dead philosopher in the hope of seeing a hidden 
premise, an alternate answer, or to inspire a new development. 
Of course, Schopenhauer said “reading is merely a surrogate for 
thinking for yourself, it means letting someone else direct your 
thoughts.”60 But aphorisms aren’t always right. Reading can also 
act as a muse. We can construct (or clarify? or reveal?) an idea 
from what we have read or arguably an idea may emerge from 
the process.  When you pick up a book, say on legal philosophy 
you are challenged to consider someone else’s ideas and during 
that process cross-reference those ideas with your own. Do I 
agree? Am I convinced? What have they possibly overlooked? 
What of my experience would undermine this theory? These are 
questions we are taught to ask of a text, at least those produced 
in an academic context. And through the process of reading and 
engaging with another’s thoughts we are, if not thinking in 
monastic isolation, at least enlivening our mind with ideas.  
However, a rational reconstructor is not randomly 
selecting historical texts to stimulate ideas like a surrealist artist 
loosening their imagination. Often, in academic disciplines our 
choice in historical texts is shaped by our field of study. We 
inherit or receive texts which have formed a new way of thinking 
or created a new paradigm. Textbooks, reading lists and 
prescribed syllabuses can determine what historical texts we may 
encounter. For example, Hugo Grotius’s De Jure Belli au Pacis 
from 1625 established a new form of natural rights theory and is 
often quoted to this day. He can be a source of modern day ideas 
about international law or theories of rights. Rationally 
 
60 A Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms (1970) […]. 
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reconstructing the argument of an influential writer can help 
loosen their influence, it can help a discipline realise the errors 
of a foundational text, or it can help a field of study advance 
beyond inherited theories and ideas which on reconstruction 
appear weak. Equally there can be a process of inspiration, where 
you see a missing premise or step which could be taken which 
might allow one to build upon a foundational text. 
Of course, the complaint of anachronism looms large 
with rational reconstruction. But as Rorty argues, if rational 
reconstructions are “conducted in full knowledge of their 
anachronism, they are unobjectionable.”61 Because the only real 
problem is verbal, and nothing much hangs on the question of 
whether a rational reconstructor is doing “history” or 
“philosophy” when he or she tries to clarify what was said by a 
historical writer. However, more serious problems emerge when 
someone claims to reveal or unveil what someone “really” meant 
when the author never said anything of the sort and it is difficult 
to take such a meaning from their work. Then the question of 
what someone is doing becomes more important because 
someone is making a descriptive claim about the past which is 
difficult to verify and at best speculative. However, there is 
nothing disagreeable about a rational reconstructor offering a 
premise to a historical writer – so long as they know and make 
clear that they are not claiming this premise to be buried in the 
past and unannounced until now. 
Ian Hacking has referred to this method as the “pen-
friend approach”62 and Rorty has described this as making the 
“dead our conversational partners.”63 It is the process by which 
a reader engages with the text of and from that he or she takes 
away an opinion, theory or germ of an idea. The reader can then 
develop from this either their own idea, adopt what they think is 
the idea of that author or they can correct and instruct the author. 
However, the reader may not be, strictly speaking, sensitive or 
fully attentive, sometimes deliberately so, to either the intention 
of or context within which the original author of wrote the text. 
But for a rational reconstructor, there is no problem. They are 
possibly looking for an interlocutor, which can involve 
correcting or updating the ideas of the historical writer or 
disagreeing with them. The historical text is therefore a sounding 
board or used for a point of contrast or used as placeholder for 
an opinion or idea which the reader attributes to the text or writer.   
After you have rationally reconstructed a historical text, 
the benefits of such an approach might appear superficial. 
Reformulating an influential historical text does not ensure its 
overthrow. Dodgy theories, supported by bad arguments persist; 
 
61 R Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres” in R Rorty, J B 
Schneewind, Q Skinner (eds), Philosophy in History: Essays in the 
Historiography of Philosophy (1984). 
62 I Hacking, “Five parables” 103 
63 R Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres” 247. 
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belligerent interlocutors are all too common. You might say then 
that making contradiction or inconsistency clear does not always 
work. Going to the trouble of rational reconstruction is a waste 
of time. But as Rorty showed in his book, Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature using history and well-known figures in your 
analysis of philosophy gives flesh to the bones. As I said earlier, 
Rorty argued that “more ‘scientific’ and ‘rigorous’ philosophy” 
becomes “the less it has to relate to culture and world we 
experience. By taking to task, for example, and influential writer, 
through rational reconstruction, you can “ground” your criticism 
and make it more difficult for the listener to shrug it off.64 
Rational reconstruction which is historical can also, as I said, 
inspire. Again, as I noted earlier, according to MacIntyre, part of 
the problem which analytical philosophy faces is that it is often 
“unable to provide decisive answer to substantive philosophical 
questions.”65 It can, according to MacIntyre, “rule out certain 
possibilities” but “for each alternative view that remains” it can 
only identify “what commitments one will be making by way of 
entailments and presuppositions, it is not capable in itself of 
producing any reason for asserting any one thing over any 
other.”66 But as I have suggested, you can through the process of 
rational reconstruction spot an opportunity, an alternative or a 
possible development which is profitable. 
You might say, what’s the difference between reading a 
contemporary text and a historical text? Based on my 
description, rational reconstruction does not appear to be much 
more than a literature review, albeit a potentially far reaching 
one in terms of time. Furthermore, it carries with it the 
implication that you do not necessarily care for the historical 
meaning or intention of the author. On that basis, reading the 
Merchant of Venice is just as useful as reading Grotius - both 
offer a seventeenth century consideration of contracts. Neither 
of these are necessarily reasons to reject a rational reconstruction 
of a historical text. They could merely be descriptions of how 
one engages with a text which you disagree with. Moreover, at 
an elementary level, rational reconstruction may ensure you do 
not repeat some else’s thoughts or enable you to distinguish 
yourself from a historical writer. Or you can show why your new 
concept or idea is an improvement or advancement. This is not a 
frivolous point. 
For example, “the descriptive information that we get 
from doing conceptual history can help us make progress in 
figuring out which concepts will help make a given instance of 
 
64 Ibid, 5 
65 G Borradori, The American Philosopher: Conversations With Quine, 
Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre, and Kuhn by 
Giovanna Borradori (1994) 145. 
66 Ibid. 
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inquiry go best.”67 It can give us counterexamples of why 
replacing a concept or idea is not an improvement or demonstrate 
similar moves which have been unsuccessful. As Plunkett says, 
“awareness of such historical facts can help one be attuned to 
aspects of a concept’s content that one might otherwise overlook 
or failed to adequately appreciate” if it were not for the 
knowledge we have of how the concept emerged or developed 
in a specific period for a specific need.68 Indeed, it can involve a 
more serious engagement with the author, which requires the 
theorist to clarify their own view point. A good example of this, 
I think, is Neil MacCormick’s consideration of Kant, Smith and 
Viscount Stair in Practical Reason and Morality and Law. In 
that book, MacCormick reconsidered Smith’s impartial 
spectator, Kant’s categorical imperative and Stair’s notion that 
law was the dictate of reason. He clarified in his own terms each 
idea and reinterpreted each author. From this MacCormick 
offered an account of property, contract and liberty based on a 
rational reconstruction of these authors. But for all its merits, the 
rational reconstruction path can only recommend history; it does 
not mean it is necessary or essential to provide an adequate 
theory of an institution or practice such as private law.      
 
Historical reconstruction 
Another path is historical reconstruction. Here you take the text 
and construct it in a manner which is sensitive to the context, 
convention and intention. The theory or idea is constructed, 
avoiding anachronism or the temptation to project into the past 
modern ideas. Utmost care is often given to the sources being 
handled and their authenticity. Dates, times and places are as 
important as a clear articulation of the theory. But the theory or 
idea will never be constructed in a manner which deviates from 
the original intention of the author. To use Skinner’s maxim, “no 
agent should be said to have done or meant something which that 
agent could never be brought to accept as a correct description 
of what he had meant or done.” You can update the language; 
you can reformulate the phrasing; but do not try to attribute a 
meaning to an author which bears little plausible resemblance to 
what they said in their own language.   
Rational reconstruction and historical reconstruction can 
be done together. But often they pull in different directions. The 
more historicising you do, the more difficult it becomes to 
engage with an author as a contemporary. Often therefore 
historical reconstruction can stress how alien or foreign or 
distant or unfamiliar the past is. It will often be coupled with a 
sense that historical cultures, languages and philosophy are 
specific creations or inventions of a context, the language, 
 
67 D Plunkett, “Conceptual history, conceptual ethics, and the aims of inquiry: 
a framework for thinking about the relevance of the history/genealogy of 
concepts to normative inquiry” (2016) 3 (2) Ergo 27-64. 
68 Ibid, 52. 
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geography, economy, science of that time. You might say, on 
this approach, for example, that the philosophy expressed in 
ancient Greece is the result of a constellation of unique factors, 
which we may never be able to recreate or will never reoccur. In 
a general sense, historical can lead to historicism. An increasing 
accumulation of artefacts, archelogy, and knowledge of the past 
can often overwhelm the historian into submission of his or her 
subject’s uniqueness and when juxtaposed with modernity it can 
generate a sense of strangeness or disconnection with the subject 
of study.  
Additionally, rational reconstruction is often associated 
with relativism, which would hold there to be no objective truth 
but only different perspectives on questions of, for example 
morality, politics or knowledge. It can be linked also to the idea 
that historical knowledge of the past is in fact inaccessible, 
isolated in the past and beyond us. That opinion can often lead 
to a flip of the analysis; now the historian’s own views, 
perspective or prejudices become the focus of study or 
consideration. Questions may then arise as to how the historian 
is somehow projecting on to the past, or creating history or 
construction a narrative and what benefit can therefore emerge 
from this control of the past. Another aspect of historicism is that 
often it can be said fragment the present or challenge the 
present’s sense of truth or objectivity. If you stress that past 
cultures, societies and ideas are contingent or contextually 
constructed and intricately linked to circumstance, this poses 
pointed questions to those who would otherwise present their 
understanding or theory as being independent of contingencies 
such as language, culture or politics.  
However, rather than slip into isolation or completely 
surrender history to critiques of arbitrary subjectivism, historical 
reconstruction does try to salvage some knowledge of past. It is 
an attempt to grasp the ideas or theories of the past. Different 
methodologies have been developed to bridge the otherwise 
apparent gap between historicism’s alienation of the past and the 
desire to gather knowledge of those theories and ideas. The most 
familiar is that of Skinner and the Cambridge School. Skinner 
developed an approach to the history of thought which built upon 
Austin’s notion of a speech act. Skinner has argued that the 
history of thought should not be concerned with the motive, 
meaning or truth of a proposition or idea but only the intention 
of the speaker or writer. On Skinner’s analysis, you can discern 
the intention of an author from context and language. You get an 
understanding of an idea through a construction of the linguistic 
practices of whatever period one is considering. This includes 
developing an understanding who the statement was made to and 
the context within which the statement or proposition or idea was 
uttered.   
Historical reconstruction can salvage ideas from the past 
and emphasis the contingency of today, at least if you follow 
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Skinner. Indeed, the Skinner and the Cambridge School more 
generally are associated with stressing the importance and for 
some the centrally of language in shaping our ideas and 
concepts; as language evolves, so do concepts and ideas. Skinner 
has said that this does not necessarily lead to relativism but what 
he argues is that it does emphasis the transient nature of the 
theories, concepts and ideas which we use. It also creates self-
consciousness and inoculates against self-congratulatory 
histories or theories. Those who write historical reconstructions 
often challenge, implicitly if not explicitly, the totalising or 
dogmatic tenancies of ‘big ideas’ which can be intolerant, 
divisive and wrong. In other words, historical reconstructions 
can set a benchmark or pose questions which need to be 
answered before one can claim to have ‘cracked’ the ‘perpetual’ 
problems of political or moral philosophy. It can also, like 
rational reconstruction, help generate new ideas. By placing 
contemporary problems or ideas against the mirror of the past, it 
can help a writer develop a new way of viewing things, like 
finding an artefact from the past which inspires a contemporary 
creation. This is what Skinner did when he spoke of the third 
conception of liberty, after he explored Hobbes and his context 
in detail he rediscovered a republican notion of liberty which had 
been otherwise overlooked or forgotten.69 But again, whether it 
can inspire, challenge or deepen our understanding historical 
reconstruction is not strictly necessary for theory. This genre 
cannot say that theory needs to be historical; it can only 
recommend it and be used to challenge or criticise. It may also 
reveal possibilities and reset the horizon of what is possible to 
consider. 
It might be worth clarifying what I see as the differences 
between historical and rational reconstruction. It could be said 
that both aim to a greater or lesser extent to ascribe to actions of 
historical actors a degree of intelligibility or rationality; that they 
both share a concern with understanding either an idea of the past 
or the formulation of an idea. However, I see two differences. 
Rational reconstruction will judge or argue with the text in 
question. Generally, historical reconstruction does not do that. 
Whereas rational reconstruction is done with the aim of either 
re-educating, reordering or updating a historical idea, historical 
reconstruction takes things as they are; it sees, as much as 
possible, as the past saw things. If the idea was constructed 
badly, even inconsistently or illogically then so be it. Where 
things have been said, which are no longer unpalatable historical 
reconstruction will as much as possible hold its nose and report 
what was said and intended. For a historical reconstructor there 
is artificiality in what rational reconstruction does as it goes 
beyond what either the context or the text would allow. This 
leads to my secondly difference, which is more important. 
 
69 Q Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (1998). 
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Rational reconstruction may say something like, “with the help 
of terminology introduced by Hohfeld and developed by Hart, 
Grotius’ original use right is best described as a liberty or 
privilege rather than a claim right.”70 It can also assume ideas 
existed, waiting to be found later; for example, “democratic 
norms and practice were in a deep sleep for almost two millennia 
between their ancient birth and modern rebirth.” 71Or “the New 
England democratic movement anticipated the Leveller’s 
pioneering application of democratic accountability to 
representative, constitutional government.”72 What rational 
reconstruction is prepared to do, is attribute a meaning to 
Grotius’s concept of use right or suggest that something was 
discovered. In both instances, it is assumed, or it appears to be 
assumed, that the idea existed already or lies in stack waiting for 
time to run along the shelf and pick it up. I should stress, I do not 
make criticism here of either approach but I do highlight the 




The last path I want to consider is geistesgeschichte or history of 
the human spirit, which is in many ways synonymous with 
Hegel.73 In 1822, 1828 and 1830, Hegel (1770-1831) delivered 
a series of lectures which came to be known as Vorlesungen über 
die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (Lectures on the Philosophy 
of World History).74 Hegel argued for a new conception of 
history and philosophy, a philosophical history or a 
geistesgechichte. He said “…the Philosophy of History means 
nothing but the thoughtful consideration of it.”75 Although Hegel 
was satisfied with this definition, it is somewhat elusive. 
However, Hegel goes on to explain that, the historian would 
draw from their sources a story of rational development which 
could in turn give the events, happens and actions of history a 
yet unknown meaning and significance. Hegel acknowledged 
that to “insist upon Thought in this connection with history” may 
be “unsatisfactory” to some because the historian may assume 
“Thoughts must be subordinate to what is given” by reality and 
 
70 J Salter, “Grotius & Pufendorf: the right of necessity” in L May & E McGill 
(ed), Grotius and Law (2014) 181-200 at 184. 
71 J S Maloy, The Colonial American Origins of Modern Democractic 
Thought (2008) 3. 
72 Ibid, 5. 
73 As Collingwood says, “[a]nyone who reads his Philosophy of History by 
itself cannot but think it a profoundly original and revolutionary work, 
wherein history for the first time steps out full-grown on the stage of 
philosophical thought. But when consideration is given to the work of his 
predecessors [Kant, Herder, Finchte, Schelling], his book becomes far less 
startling and less original” R Collingwood, The Idea of History (1956) 112. 
74 G W F Hegel, Lectures on the philosophy of history (trans) J Sibree 
(London, 1914). 
75 Ibid, 8-9 
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facts, which should then shape the type of history one tells. 
Whereas the philosopher may argue that philosophy “dwells in 
the region of self-produced ideas, without reference to 
actuality.”76 To do otherwise – to approach philosophy with this 
understanding of history and history with philosophy – is to 
“force [history] into conformity with a tyrannous idea, and to 
construe it, as the phrase is, ‘a priori’. However, Hegel says that 
the “only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the 
contemplation of History, is the simple conception of Reason; 
that Reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the 
world, therefore ,presents us with a rational process.”77 On this 
basis, Hegel says his history of the world will be both of the 
physical and psychological phenomenon of the world but 
predominantly of the psychological; or the “Spirit, and the 
course of its development…”78 In summary, he says the “History 
of the world is none other than the progress of consciousness of 
Freedom; a progress whose development according to the 
necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate.”79  
But the progress of the consciousness of Freedom from 
the ancient Greeks to the 19th century was not straightforward. 
The Persians defeated the Greeks; the Visigoths ransacked 
Rome; the Reformation ended in division; the French revolution 
descended into tyranny; and so on. “There are many considerable 
points in History” he says, where “the whole gain of a previous 
culture appears to have been entirely lost.”80 However, Hegel 
sees through this process an important interaction between 
thesis, antithesis and eventual synthesis; Reason through the 
actions of men, is working toward the realisation of the Geist. 
History in of itself – its events, happenings and actions – 
represents for Hegel’s philosophical historian the working out of 
Freedom to an eventual state where there is a full consciousness 
of Freedom manifest in the world. For Hegel each stage of 
history represents an idea, which reason, at some point, reveals 
to be contradictory - for example, Athenians recognised free 
individuality, which was contradicted by slavery and the 
unexamined tradition or habits of ancient Greece. The 
contradiction then leads to the dominant idea which is embodied 
in a society to an end, and through this process a new form of 
idea arises. History tracks this dialectic movement, in stages, 
until eventually it reaches the point of realisation of Freedom.  
Hegel’s philosophical history is a hard sell to historians. 
He knew this when he said “the suggestion that history should 
be philosophical appears to be diametrically opposed to that of 
the historiographer.”81 A historian would prefer to say it was his 
 
76 Ibid, 9 
77 Ibid, 9 
78 Ibid, 17 
79 Ibid, 20 
80 Ibid, 58 
81 Ibid, 9 
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or her task to simply “adopt into [history’s] records what is and 
has been actual occurrences and transactions” and to maintain 
that history “remains true to its character in proportion as it 
strictly adhere to its data.”82 Many modern historians would say 
something similar. However, Hegel does not just require a 
philosophical disposition. Rather to follow a Hegel and his 
understanding of history, you need to see historical events as 
being related in a material causal sense but in a teleological and 
meaningful sense. You see behind the otherwise singular events 
of history a purpose, the Geist. Or you see the process 
(dialectics) by which the Geist is continually working towards 
its realisation. You see history as working towards an end goal. 
In that sense, you will also understand the individual actions of 
men and woman as being not just important but also part of a 
much larger narrative; there is a connection between the actions 
of individuals, namely the Geist. But men and woman in history 
do not fully grasp that the work of the Geist, and least not until 
Hegel. Hence, for Hegel there is an unconscious movement in 
history which is not explicitly represented or recorded in the 
reports and accounts we receive from the past. It is through the 
“cunning of reason” that history steps forward through the 
actions of men and women. Additionally, for Hegel human 
actions are done for a reason and are influenced by the ideas we 
have and a need for self-realisation. Moreover, you will see a 
process in history which can be used to illuminate the present 
either by revealing to us the real reason why something 
happened or by offering to an opportunity to grasp the ultimate 
purpose of our own life, full consciousness of Freedom.  
Hegel is marmite. Schopenhauer said that the brilliance 
of Kant was squandered by the generation that followed with 
“the greatest effrontery in serving up sheer nonsense, in 
scrabbling together senseless and maddening webs of words, 
such as had previously been heard only in madhouses, finally 
appeared in Hegel.”83 Despite this, modern philosophers such as 
Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre have advocated a 
Hegelian approach to contemporary philosophical problems. I 
think MacIntyre and Taylor help us understand what can be 
taken from Hegel (and what you might leave behind). First, a 
concern for finding and articulating what Hegel might call the 
“unreal consciousness” or what Taylor calls, what we have 
forgotten; second, a form of social theory which stresses that 
ideas, concepts and theories can operate, influence and shape 
individuals and society and often these function by providing a 
limiting paradigm in society; three, a historical awareness which 
explains the development of ideas and society, arguing that due 
to inherit contradictions in prevailing paradigms, there is a 
 
82 Ibid, 9 
83 A Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol 1 (1818-19) 
(trans) E F J Payne (1969) 429. 
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driving force towards a new paradigm; four, a demand that the 
historian be in the present as much as the past.  
Like Hegel, Taylor and MacIntyre challenge 
conventional views of what history is. For example, “history” 
says MacIntyre “in our culture means academic history, and 
academic history is less than two centuries old.”84 He asks us to 
consider whether our modern conceptions of what history is, 
derives from contestable philosophical presuppositions. For 
MacIntyre, the history of philosophy is not “value-neutral” and 
his own narrative which divides into stages “presupposes 
standards of achievement and failure, of order and disorder.”85 
History which claims to be value-neutral is on his analysis the 
product of a mode of thinking (a tradition) which itself had a 
starting point in the past. According to MacIntyre, once you 
grasp this, you will then be able to see that what is shaping the 
practice of history, and how we view the past, are ideas, concepts 
and practices which are themselves inherited. From this 
perspective, history becomes the exploration of those ideas, 
concepts and practices which are inherited, which is an 
exploration of what people have thought and what has been 
passed on. Thereafter, MacIntyre suggests there are generally 
three traditions, all of which have their starting point in the past. 
But he says through the process of historical philosophy, you are 
able to determine which tradition is preferable. On those terms, 
MacIntyre is Hegelian.86  
Taylor too has argued that “philosophy and history are 
one.”87 He says that “it is essential to an adequate understanding 
of certain problems, questions, issues, that one understands them 
 
84 A MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd edn, (2007) 4. 
85 Ibid, 3 
86 But he is not in other ways. He argues that if philosophy were to take its 
history seriously, it would find that modern philosophical disagreements are 
the result of three rival traditions – Thomist, liberal and post-modern - which 
are incommensurable. Per MacIntyre, given the incommensurability of these 
dominate world-views the only hope of progress in philosophy is for the study 
itself to become historical. In becoming historical, you discover that only one 
of these rival theories can explain why these other traditions emerged and 
why only one of these traditions can be an improvement upon these other 
traditions. For him, the encyclopaedic (or liberal tradition) and the 
genealogical tradition (or post-modern) traditions do not have the capability 
within their own systems or internalised rationalities to explain and 
incorporate their rivals, it is only the Thomist tradition which has the 
capabilities and resources to speak to its rivals and to demonstrate where each 
went wrong and why it is an improvement. History for MacIntyre offers a 
backdrop against which you can arbitrate between rival theories. And in his 
own history of rationality and morality, MacIntyre tells a story of a rise and 
fall of the Thomist tradition which was cast aside by the Enlightenment. See 
A MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, 
Genealogy, and Tradition (1990). 
87 C Taylor, “Philosophy and its past” in R Rorty, J B Schneewind, Q Skinner 
(eds), Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy 
(1984) 17. 
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genetically.”88 But Taylor says that we are in part hamstrung 
because the “discourse [of history or anthropology] we use is 
continuous with that of our forebears. We write books and 
treatise like [James George] Frazer, with claims supported by not 
totally dissimilar canons of evidence and argument.”89 Even 
though we may have “big doubts” about “some of the ‘scientific’ 
claims”90 we make about the past and our ability to truly perceive 
and understand the past in an “objective manner” we continue to 
cast history or anthropology or historical studies in that light. 
However, Taylor “rejects altogether the Hegelian single line of 
development” but argues for retaining “something like the notion 
of potentiality.”91 By potentiality, Taylor means “we have it in 
us [whether Greek or modern] from the beginning to become 
what we later become.”92 He clarifies however that to “speak of 
potentialities does not mean to suppose a unitary set. We can and 
increasingly do recognize diverse lines of possible development, 
some of which seem incompatible with each other, at least at first 
blush.”93 However, Taylor does argue that history “seems to 
exhibit some irreversible developments.”94 For Taylor, there is 
something stable through history which is the potential of man 
to achieve what he later achieves. 
Taylor also explains the relationship between history and 
philosophy and how each can work together to articulate, reveal 
or rediscover implicit paradigms or forgotten assumptions (what 
Hegel might have called a false consciousness). First, Taylor 
says philosophy is “an activity which essentially involves among 
other things, the redescription of what we are doing, thinking, 
believing and assuming in such a way that we bring our reason 
to light more perspicuously or else make the alternative more 
apparent, or in some way or other are better enabled to justified 
stand to our action, thought, belief, assumption.”95 However, 
secondly, Taylor does not think that it is optional to be historical; 
to attempt a redescription, without recourse to history is to miss 
the point and importantly to assume too much. Rather he stresses 
that there has often been a “forgetting” or a backdrop which 
needs to be rediscovered, articulated and illuminated before we 
are able to offer an adequate redescription of what we are doing, 
thinking or believing in the present. History does this. Hence, he 
says the reason a “genetic account” or historical of our 
understanding is “indispensable has something to do with the 
 
88 Ibid, 17. 
89 C Taylor, “History, Hegel and Comparison” in F E Reynolds & David 
Tracy (eds), Myth and Philosophy (1990) 39. 
90 Ibid, 38. 
91 Ibid, 54. 
92 Ibid, 51. 
93 Ibid, 53. 
94 Ibid, 52. 
95 Ibid, 18. 
Working Draft – April 2021 – School of Law – University of Glasgow 
25 
nature of the forgetting” of the present.96 He goes on to say that 
“if you want to break loose, you need to understand the past in 
order to liberate yourself.”97 It is by going backwards and 
uncovering or discovering the debates, decisions and arguments 
which have constructed or animated our received paradigms or 
boundaries that we can then make progress. He says “an outlook 
which may have been won by a heroic effort to be the basis of 
widespread social practice” may continue “to inform the life of 
a society” but at the same time assumes such a status that it 
becomes “virtually unchallengeable to common-sense even 
though the original formulations and especially their background 
reasons may be widely neglected, rehearsed only by 
specialists.”98 For example a great deal of contemporary contract 
theory writes against the background of political theory and 
historical narratives. This is unsurprising if you take the 
seventeenth century as setting the paradigms of contemporary 
political and legal theory. Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, 
inter alia, wrote against a backdrop of purposively excluding 
theology, of appealing to abstract or practical reason, and using 
hypothetical states of nature to describe the origins of the state, 
rights and law. 
Modern Hegelians also stress that philosophical history 
should focus as much on the past as on the present. Both 
MacIntyre and Taylor stress that a philosophical history should 
try to inform, reveal and explain the present; that is, how the past 
effects or has constructed the present, and how our thinking and 
understanding of the world has an origin in the past. This 
approach, gives a historian a firm footing and purpose. It also 
avoids the arid fields of antiquarism or the speculative planes of 
predicting the future. Again, you do not need to say that all 
history, should be concerned with explaining or describing the 
“whys” and “hows” of the present but if you follow a Hegelian 
approach then you will invariably be involved with such a task 
to a great or lessor extent. You may see you task as to reveal the 
false consciousness of the present or merely to shed light upon 
what we have inherited from the past.   
Rorty says that the geistesgechichte is 
uncharacteristically sure about what philosophy is whereas other 
philosophers are not so sure. More generally, Rorty questions 
whether the Hegelian approach has not presupposed a great deal 
- the purpose of philosophy, the problems it deals with and the 
way these problems should be solved. In part, Rorty’s concern is 
that a modern Hegelian may take a conception of what 
philosophy is and drive into the past with a self-assured (modern) 
conception which excludes as much as it includes specific 
 
96 C Taylor, “Philosophy and its past” in R Rorty, J B Schneewind, Q Skinner 
(eds), Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy 
(1984). 
97 R Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres”. 
98 Ibid. 
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writers, texts and ideas. He says that often such histories include 
writers or texts which are unusual or not normally considered to 
be speaking to or address the same problems or questions. Rorty 
notes that this type of philosophical history stays at the level of 
problematics and is less concerned with solutions. His 
implication is clear, Hegelian histories are unconstructive and do 
not offer anything substantive other than critique and an 
explanation of problems. He says that the Hegelian historian asks 
“why should anyone have made the question of ___ central to 
his thought?”99 The modern Hegelian asks this with the purpose 
of establishing an ongoing problem which they believe only 
history can make evident to philosophy. Or you might say that 
they are trying to explain modern problematics by returning to 
the past, although Rorty’s suggestion is that Hegelians 
manufacture the very problems which then serve as the subject 
of analysis.  
He goes on to say often philosophical histories “want to 
justify the historian and his friends in having the sort of 
philosophical concerns they have – in taking philosophy to be 
what they take it to be – rather than in give in the particular 
solution to philosophical problems they give. It wants to give 
plausibility to certain image of philosophy rather than to give 
plausibility to a particular solution of a given philosophical 
problem.”100 Rorty suggests that philosophical historians may 
unfairly disagree with a philosopher from the past because he 
hasn’t written about or considered or adequately addressed a 
question which he negligently, wrongfully, unconsciously or 
unscrupulously forgetful or neglectful of. “He does this by 
assembling a cast of historical characters and a dramatic 
narrative that show how we have come to ask the questions we 
now think inescapable and profound.”101 Here Rorty is gesturing 
to the excavation of the “false consciousness” of society and 
what that entails. Often it can involve the creation of a history 
which is not necessarily recognisable to or deviates substantially 
from existing histories.  More generally, as Hilary Putnam 
observed in supposing hidden patterns and powers which operate 
in history, Hegelians may see a relationship between, for 
example, Descartes, Adam Smith and James Bond – i.e. 
individualism – whereas to a non-Hegelian there is nothing much 
at all connecting these characters.102 To be a Hegelian you often 
must see what is otherwise not evident – God, historical 
materialism, the spirit of the age, etc. - which is difficult for a 
sceptic, materialist, nominalist or pragmatist. 
Nevertheless, despite Rorty demonstrating the 
characteristics, patterns and strategies of a Hegelian approach, 
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about its contribution. He does not think that we can do away 
with the historiography of philosophy; he does not think that 
“thick intellectual history…wary of canons (philosophical, 
literary, scientific, or other)” are enough.103 He argues that we 
need to keep Hegelian approaches because:104 
 
“…we cannot get along without heroes. We need 
mountain peaks to look up toward. We need to tell 
ourselves detailed stories about the mighty dead in order 
to make our hopes of surpassing them concrete. We also 
need the idea that there is such a thing as “philosophy” in 
the honorific sense – the idea that there are, had we but 
the wit to pose them, certain questions that everybody 
should always have been asking. We cannot give us this 
idea without giving up the notion that the intellectuals of 
the previous epochs of European history form a 
community, a community of which it is good to be a 
member. If we are to persist in this image of ourselves, 
then we have to have both imaginary conversations with 
the dead and the conviction that we have seen further 
than they. That means that we need Geistesgeschichte, 
self-justificatory conversations.” 
 
Because Rorty has a generous (undefined) conception of what 
philosophy is, he is happy for there to be all three genres of 
rational reconstruction, historical reconstruction and 
geistesgeschichte to co-exist. The task of philosophy is, for him, 
akin to literature or poetry or an artistic expression of human 
experience.   
 
Conclusion 
In summary, today you may hear complaints about private law 
theory’s approach to history. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
there was a great deal of historical writing relating to (but not 
always exclusively) about private law.105 Nevertheless, in recent 
years history has figured less in private law theory or those 
engaged in history and theory have neglected the theoretical side 
of their work for history.106 In this paper I have tried to suggest, 
if the theorist were to address these complaints how they might 
do their theory and draw upon the methodological approaches 
taken in philosophy, particularly Anglo-American analytical 
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105 For example, L M Friedman, A History of American Law (1973); B 
Gilmore, Death of Contract (1974); M Horwitz, The Transformation of 
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philosophy. Of course, every theory of law in some way 
implicitly or explicitly deals with the past and has some sort of 
conception of history or time. It may be undeveloped, 
rudimentary or deliberately side-lined but what has gone before 
is part of the fabric of law, legal reasoning and how we analyse; 
it just might not always be evident or examined. But I have tried 
to show in this paper three possible ways through which you can 
theorise about private law. It may be that, for example, critical 
legal histories share the most in common with a contextualised 
approach whereas others may be more inclined, whether 
knowingly or not, towards a Hegelian approach. But there are 
other approaches and ways in which history and theory can be 
used together. Therefore, I understand these three approaches 
outlined above as strands of theoretical writing which have a 
historical sensibility or which overtly include and incorporate the 
past (or history) into their theorising. I do not see these as 
definitive categories, there could be more; this division is far 
from absolute and each may in some ways overlap with the other 
but if we are going to do private law theory historically, these 
are potential paths. 
